Children should be seen and not herd. The opposite goes for Tor
relays.
Arisbe
On 8/30/2018 2:11 PM, Nathaniel Suchy
wrote:
So this exit node is censored by Turkey. That means
any site blocked in Turkey is blocked on the exit. What about an
exit node in China or Syria or Iraq? They censor, should exits
there be allowed? I don't think they should. Make them relay
only, (and yes that means no Guard or HSDir flags too) situation
A could happen. The odds might not be in your favor. Don't risk
that!
Cordially,
Nathaniel Suchy
This
particular case receiving mentions for at least a few
months...
D1E99DE1E29E05D79F0EF9E083D18229867EA93C kommissarov
185.125.33.114
The relay won't [likely] be badexited because neither it nor
its upstream is
shown to be doing anything malicious. Simple censorship isn't
enough.
And except for such limited censorship, the nodes are
otherwise fully
useful, and provide a valuable presence inside such regions /
networks.
Users, in such censoring regimes, that have sucessfully
connected
to tor, already have free choice of whatever exits they wish,
therefore
such censorship is moot for them.
For everyone else, and them, workarounds exist such as,,,
https://onion.torproject.org/
http://yz7lpwfhhzcdyc5y.onion/
search engines, sigs, vpns, mirrors, etc
Further, whatever gets added to static exitpolicy's might move
out
from underneath them or the censor, the censor may quit, or
the exit
may fail to maintain the exitpolicy's. None of which are true
representation
of the net, and are effectively censorship as result of
operator action
even though unintentional / delayed.
Currently many regimes do limited censorship like this,
so you'd lose all those exits too for no good reason, see...
https://ooni.torproject.org/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_and_surveillance_by_country
And arbitrarily hamper spirits, tactics, and success of
volunteer
resistance communities and operators in, and fighting, such
regimes
around the world.
And if the net goes chaotic, majority of exits will have
limited visibility,
for which exitpolicy / badexit are hardly manageable solutions
either,
and would end up footshooting out many partly useful yet
needed
exits as well.
If this situation bothers users, they can use... SIGNAL
NEWNYM,
New Identity, or ExcludeExitNodes.
They can also create, maintain and publish lists of whatever
such
classes of nodes they wish to determine, including various
levels
of trust, contactability, verification, ouija, etc... such
that others
can subscribe to them and Exclude at will.
They can further publish patches to make tor automatically
read such lists, including some modes that might narrowly
exclude
and route stream requests around just those lists of censored
destination:exit pairings.
Ref also...
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS197328%20flag:exit
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:tr%20flag:exit
In the subect situations, you'd want to show that it is in
fact
the exit itself, not its upstream, that is doing the
censorship.
Or that if fault can't be determined to the upstream or exit,
what
would be the plausible malicious benefit for an exit /
upstream
to block a given destination such that a badexit is
warranted...
a) Frustrate and divert off 0.001% of Turk users smart enough
to
use tor, chancing through tor client random exit selection of
your
blocking exit, off to one of the workarounds that you're
equally
unlikely to control and have ranked, through your exit vs one
of the others tor has open?
b) Prop up weird or otherwise secretly bad nodes on the net,
like the hundreds of other ones out there, for which no
badexit
or diverse subscription services yet exist to qualify them?
c) ???
Or that some large number of topsites were censored via
singular or small numbers of exits / upstreams so as to be
exceedingly annoying to the network users as a whole, where
no other environment of such / chaotic widespread annoyance
is known to exist at the same time.
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--
One person's moral compass is another person's face in the dirt.
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