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Re: [tor-relays] Lets increase Routing Security for Tor related BGP Prefixes



Here’s OVH’s non-response:

>>>>Start OVH
Thank you for contacting OVH with regards to BGP hijacking; we apologize for the delay in response.

From the current status of discussion on the subject, it appears implementing ROA / RPKI is still in development but not a priority; I am afraid at the moment we have no information on a possible ETA for it.

The goal would be to eventually implement BGPSec , as ROA / RPKI only verifies the origin of an IP address regarding the AS which is announcing it.

At the moment, what we propose to you is to ensure you have ways of detecting BGP hijacks on your services; for instance you may search online for "how to detect BGP hijacking on my service".

Shall you have any doubts or concerns, please let us know.

For any other questions or concerns, please feel free to contact us through a support ticket or through our toll-free line at 1-855-684-5463. We’re here 24/7 to help you!

We thank you again for choosing OVH,
<<<<STOP OVH

I’m still mulling how to respond.

> On Aug 26, 2018, at 10:30 AM, nusenu <nusenu-lists@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> Signed PGP part
> 
> 
> Paul Templeton:
>> Ticket number 165858113 created. We will wait for a response and I will post it.
>> 
>> :-) Paul
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> OVH Ticket Number 6993458396 created.
> 
> 
> thanks appreciated,
> looking forward to the answers.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> --
> https://twitter.com/nusenu_
> https://mastodon.social/@nusenu
> 
> 
> 

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