Re: [tor-relays] Archive key from deb.torproject.org was renewed!

[eff_03675549@xxxxxxxxx]

Hi all,

wait: I just installed a fresh relay and the torproject is still outdated with the old keyring!
(I had to add sudo apt-key adv --recv-keys --keyserver keys.gnupg.net  74A941BA219EC810 to my script).

Isn't this insane given that new comers are going to install vulnerable relays by default?

how come the new installs still have to update?

Carlos.

On 8/2/24 5:16 PM, telekobold wrote:

> Hi
>       boldsuck,
>       
>       
>       thank you for your messages and the explanations. To be honest, I
>       wasn't aware that the GPG key has to be updated manually every two
>       years. However, I still have a few comprehension questions:
>       
>       
>       On 16.07.24 14:03, boldsuck wrote:
>       
>       
> > wget -qO-
> > https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89.asc
> >         | gpg --dearmor | tee
> >         /usr/share/keyrings/tor-archive-keyring.gpg >/dev/null
> >         
> >       
>       
>       What exactly is the purpose of "gpg --dearmor" and of "tee" here?
>       Why isn't is enough to just type
>       
>       wget -qO-
> https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89.asc
>       > /usr/share/keyrings/tor-archive-keyring.gpg
>       
>       ?
>       
>       I compared the output with and without the "gpg --dearmor" using
>       diff, it is exactly the same. And the only effect of tee is that
>       the binary output is also printed to the terminal. There is even
>       something that is interpreted as a line break at the end of the
>       binary .gpg file so that the terminal tries to execute "1;2c"
>       which leads to an error. However, with the shortened command,
>       everything also works without errors.
>       
>       
>       >> apt-key -list
>       /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/deb.torproject.org-keyring.gpg
>       
>       [...]
>       
>       > Sorry, above is the key that is installed by the package
>       deb.torproject.org-keyring.
>       
>       > gpg --show-keys /usr/share/keyrings/tor-archive-keyring.gpg
>       shows you the one imported via wget.
>       
>       
>       On my relays (installed "the standard way" using the manuals at
>       the torproject.org website), both commands output the same GPG key
>       with the fingerprint
>       
>       A3C4 F0F9 79CA A22C DBA8  F512 EE8C BC9E 886D DD89
>       
>       So, there seems to be no other Tor-related GPG key installed by
>       the package deb.torproject.org-keyring, just the GPG key manually
>       installed via the above wget command.
>       
>       
>       
>       And finally, it would be nice if one could check the fingerprint
>       of this key on future physical Tor relay operators meetups like
>       the one at the Chaos Communication Camp. I'm not even sure if wget
>       does any background check based on a hierarchical certificate
>       check of the TLS certificate of torproject.org. If the TLS
>       connection would be somehow corrupted at the moment where one
>       executed the wget command an attacker could corrupt the whole
>       relay, according to my understanding. Or do I have an error in my
>       thinking here?
>       
>       
>       
>       Kind regards
>       
>       telekobold
>       
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>       
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>       
>     
-- 
PGP updated every second week : please actualize our communication every time.
  

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