Re: [tor-relays] Running an exit? Please secure your DNS with DNSCrypt+Unbound

[12xBTM <12xbtm@xxxxxxxxx>]

Running an exit? Check to make sure you have at least one backup DNS
nameserver.

If you're using Unbound/DNS Caching AND/OR DNSCrypt-proxy/DNS Proxy with
a Tor Exit node, you should read on:

--- start super tl;dr:
Have a backup DNS nameserver if your cache/proxy/whatever fails.

If you run an exit node and don't do anything with DNS, it's not a bad
idea to be sure you have at least one backup DNS nameserver.
--- stop super tl;dr:

I've been tinkering with this Unbound and DNSCrypt stuff myself. I've
certainly deviated with my own prototype setups. But let me just add a
really important bit that I've found that anyone who does this should
certainly know of:

Your currently-posted system has zero redundancy, which disrupts DNS
lookups for your traffic if just one thing hiccups, which, if it's a
fatal error in DNSCrypt OR Unbound, you just fatally terminated all DNS
queries for your node. This applies to anyone, even if you're just
running Unbound, Bind, or dnsmasq, if you mark your cache as primary and
it fails, and you didn't name a valid secondary nameserver, your exit
node just lost DNS service, and so did everyone on your circuits.

---- Start tl;dr:

Jessie's currently-posted system: You cache encrypted DNS info, which if
anything fails, your clients don't get DNS info.

My system: I cache encrypted DNS info, if caching fails on a query, I
bypass it until it works. If encryption fails, I bypass it until it
works again (non-encryption non-caching is normal for an exit node)

I set Unbound to use 6 DNSCrypt-Proxies (Sorted by ping in case a proxy
goes down temporarily or permanently). I just added more instances in
Forward-zone in unbound.conf.

I set Unbound as my primary nameserver. I set a lowest-ping DNS-Crypt
proxy as my secondary nameserver. I set my ISP default nameserver as my
tertiary nameserver. All set in /etc/resolvconf/resolv.conf.d/head

If you're just caching and not proxying DNS queries, you should mark
your secondary and tertiary as non-cached backups such as an ISP DNS or
Google DNS nameserver.

If your just proxying queries, you should mark your secondary as either
a proxy or non-proxy backup such as ISP or Google DNS, and regardless,
your tertiary should be said non-proxy backup.

--- End tl;dr:

First, I was having problems with DNSCrypt where a lag in the DNS server
would cause a DNS timeout for my client/traffic/circuit/node. So, I
added more DNSCrypt-proxies (6 of them actually, in order from lowest
ping to highest), and bound them to unbound.conf through multiple
entries in forward-zone:. This also protects the node in case one or
more of those DNSCrypt servers goes offline.

That solved 95% of my nameserver failures. So, in addition to adding my
unbound local DNS interface IP to my etc/resolvconf/resolv.conf.d/head
so I'd use Unbound (which is configured to only accept DNSCrypt-proxy
info), I also added the primary DNSCrypt-proxy server (DNSSEC-enabled of
course) on there as the secondary nameserver, so a fault in Unbound
would send requests directly to the DNSCrypt-proxy server and bypass
Unbound, maintaining DNS service and encryption, albeit with normal
non-cached performance. The next request would reattempt on the primary
nameserver, which is Unbound like I said, so each request only bypasses
if Unbound fails for any reason or for any length of time.

No nameserver failures since then. However, just because, I added a
tertiary nameserver, which is my ISP's default nameserver. So if
everything goes up in smoke, my clients can still have normal DNS info.

Jessie,
Also, in your current configuration. You have no unbound forward-zones.
Which, to my understanding, is a fatal error if you're using DNSCrypt.
Tor interfaces with Unbound on your 127.5.3.53, but how does Unbound
know where to forward queries to DNSCrypt-proxy?

I was also playing around with "edns0" in
etc/resolvconf/resolv.conf.d/head to enable extended DNS queries,
particularly since we're both increasing our buffer sizes, but I'm not
sure how that works with DNSCrypt servers, and that's what I'm currently
playing with.

I also get notices from Tor about ignoring resolve requests because
they've already been resolved. Which is funny because you'd think Tor
would not be able to distinguish the difference between resolves from
Unbound vs. any other "nameserver." Perhaps it's just a dnsevent that is
forwarded from Unbound to Tor?

If people have questions, I might end up making a github of my own setup
for them to reference. There's no point in encrypting and caching DNS if
we just end up causing DNS failures on the network.
_______________________________________________
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays