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Re: [tor-relays] tor hidden services & SSL EV certificate




On 30 Dec 2015, at 13:55, Paul Syverson <paul.syverson@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 12:27:06PM -0900, Jesse V wrote:
On 12/29/2015 11:18 AM, Aeris wrote:
A few hidden services have added an
HTTPS cert but I think that's mostly for a publicity stunt than anything
else.

As indicated in the rogerâs lecture, HTTPS is usefull for HS :
- browsers handle more securely cookies or other stuff in HTTPS mode, 
avoiding some possible leaks
- because anybody can create an HS and proxify any content, X.509 certs 
allow users to verify the authenticity of the HS (you are on the official 
Facebook HS if you have a cert with facebook.com *AND* facebookcorewwwi.onion 
inside)


I've downloaded the .webm of Roger's lecture but haven't had the time
today to listen to it. My point was that HSs already have an
authentication mechanism and it's assumed that you can verify the
address through some trusted out-of-band method, so in that case you
don't need an SSL cert. This can sometimes be superior to trusting the
centralized CA model, but I agree that the points you've listed are
useful applications as well.


In case it is helpful. Griffin Boyce and I have a paper forthcoming in
IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine on this topic. The final editorial
changes are not in so it might change a little, but you can find the
hopefully-close-to-final version at
https://github.com/saint/w2sp-2015/blob/master/SP_SPSI-2015-09-0170.R1_Syverson.pdf

It covers

- How the self-authentication of onionsites that Jesse has been noting
 and the SSL certs for registered-domain websites that Benoit asked
 about can complement each other in a variety of ways---and not just
 for big companies but for individuals, small businesses, local
 organizations, clubs, sports teams, etc.

- The current state of certs for onionsites (EV only), and what
 the issues are that stand in the way of DV certs and a proposal
 for resolving them.

- How this can all dovetail nicely with Let's Encrypt (an issuance
 and usage design that binds things together nicely so it is hard to
 undetectably set up a spoof onionsite of another onionsite
 of a registered-domain site, etc. and vice versa) once DV certs
 are allowed.

- A description of using GPG that can be done right now while waiting
 for the world to catch up, and an existing example of a site that
 does such binding (from a small site operator who found his hosting
 provider was blocking access from the Tor network). We just cited
 one such example in the paper, but there are of course others, e.g.,
 https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt

aloha,
Paul
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Thanks it's useful :) I am know wondering how i can bruteforce a clear name for my site like facebook but i think it's all good for the rest :)

- benoÃt

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