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Re: [tor-relays] Network scan results for CVE-2016-5696 / RFC5961

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Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Network scan results for CVE-2016-5696 / RFC5961
From: Ivan Markin <twim@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2016 06:05:00 +0000
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teor:
> For Tor client path selection, it is typically the vulnerable consensus
> weight that matters, not the number of relays.
> (Except in the case of HSDirs, where the hash ring is unweighted.)
> 
> Have you looked at the vulnerable consensus weight proportion?

Thanks for the tip! Laziness just took over me then.

It turns out that vulnerable consensus weight fraction is 0.249602 or 25%.

--
Ivan Markin
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References:
- Re: [tor-relays] network scan results for CVE-2016-5696 / rfc 5961
  - From: dawuud
- Re: [tor-relays] Network scan results for CVE-2016-5696 / RFC5961
  - From: Ivan Markin
- Re: [tor-relays] Network scan results for CVE-2016-5696 / RFC5961
  - From: teor

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