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Re: [tor-relays] DoS attacks on multiple relays
grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> The advantages for tor users against censorship, of operators making
> some fraction of all exit nodes exit from different addresses than
> those addresses present in consensus, have been explained many
> times on this list.
There are also advantages for tor users in keeping the hosts on which
relays run secured against attacks, which helps to keep the tor network
functioning. Having connections arrive from addresses not associable with
tor relays by the recipients of those connections hinders connectivity
among relays in the consensus, as has been explained many times on this
list. I call attention to the fact that the tor project has already decided
against Exit node secrecy by regularly publishing the results of a script
(exitmap) that reveals such addresses.
>
> It's also been noted that in at least one instance, some exit operators
> looking at constrained / creative hosting issues have chosen that
> as an enabling option too.
However, the tor project has publicly promised to identify publicly
all Exit source addresses, so that system administrators everywhere who wish
to block tor Exits to their networks may do so without blocking all tor
relays. The readily downloadable exitmap results allegedly fulfill that
promise.
Are you now alleging that, in at least one instance, the tor project
has surreptitiously broken its promise by omitting that instance's
address(es) from the exitmap file?
Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG
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