The problem with "Add repositry to /etc/apt/sources.list" is that this will not work on Ubuntu without GPG errors, since the keys used for signing the packages are unknown. And the Debian developers don't seem to publish their key fingerprints on their website.
The second problem is that the next "aptitude safe-upgrade" wants to "update" a ton of packages, presumably from Debian Testing. I did read the page on pinning, but just couldn't figure out how to make this work on Ubuntu.
So it's probably safer to wait for obfs4proxy to show up in Ubuntu repositories. Is there already a plan for that?
Best regards,
Alexander
---
PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x727A756DC55A356BOn 2015-02-05 21:17, ZEROF wrote:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 If you want to try to install jessi without updating your system it's possible. Add repositry to /etc/apt/sources.list, run apt-get update. Then use this and only this command to upgrade only that package from new repository (check if you need to replace jessie with unstable or something like that): apt-get -t jessie install name of your package You don't need to remove repository from your sources list because this command will lock upgrades of other packages. Check this url for more info:Âhttps://wiki.debian.org/AptPreferences, in section "Installing from unstable". -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: OpenPGP.js v0.7.2 Comment: http://openpgpjs.org wsFcBAEBCAAQBQJU08+wCRDHWR777fxuEQAAEpkP/3u/KvoBnRBLeQLNb4P7 wumvgdpk5cs/pLvazQvEdGI/rUb5PT+Y+i7+wDTAb6y/btVh5n+S1vzBhgTV RN6RM55CGls3shXEEhFLTUe6Pm8hONn0EtZ8V4CGWMV91/RSOfJdevMIzX/E FZOtYrRGc+ymm9XWbyZaOnPdkG5s+Y+UMBVfhEl2QhB5JnFfp8ubMzLCOZSg hFUHOuOdQTcXgO5KZ5FjtXRynRbJYitDSAwzIlen7VQCgknv+z6a4D40tQ7/ emvTaAZ3KYQzgZFugfiqBi8fUA55MkvEE+XjLFqWGj6u7zmXXQJ9EVvh6Fml +kbf8QjP/pu1TGyagrro2W+sBNHgZnm/o1nvj+a+qFiQu1NmwvJ7n4mJtYVt CwxZhBfiLemOZoX4AyS/3u21h494cAshDnPJ9J+0A1rKKjKUtejgRD19m++Q TMXpa+LPr3RRLRZUospWpMljtypu1t/masv+iM1sdgw46hF8GiM7FcGnazU8 SMy408gLLu09bCXwXKQ4hfUf68Uo8Y4v/g8BozV3GuUcaIOSTX4sCXwneMAW /f7RYslrMHfkqIQSCtulIq3fI7CQpFjtoRYCfcG5nF0IziU3lHB0cRB7uL0n zKwPYW3CiQz0O8HDCg0sdp1iuYr6yahr1WsnpBoc1AGWASTqdVgRELXHgCL6 ZMyT =FL9d -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
On 3 February 2015 at 18:33, Alexander Dietrich <alexander@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Is it possible to install the obfs4proxy package securely (with signature verification) on Ubuntu? I looked at this a while ago, but couldn't figure out how to make it work.
Thanks,
Alexander
---
PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x727A756DC55A356B
On 2015-02-03 01:14, Yawning Angel wrote:______________________________________________________________________________________________On Mon, 2 Feb 2015 22:41:40 +0000
isis <isis@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I requested that the obfs4proxy package in Debian jessie be ported to
wheezy-backports, [0] however, it seems this is extremely unlikely to
happen because it would mean backporting pretty much every Golang
package in existence.
Last I heard, that was mostly unnecessary, though how exactly this apt
pinning stuff works is a mystery to me[0].
I would be super stoked if we could make it as easy and seamless as
possible for the Bridge operators who are still running obfs2 (!!) to
move to supporting better, newer Pluggable Transports. Currently
recommended PTs to run are: obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, and
fteproxy. When Tor Browser 4.5 becomes stable (probably in mid-April
2015), we'll want lots more obfs4 Bridges! For the super adventurous
sysadmins who'd like to try Yawning's experimental new post-quantum
PT, Basket [1] is one of the newest PTs.
More obfs4 bridges would be amazing. It's worth noting that obfs4proxy
can also handle obfs2 and 3 (and with a branch that I need to
test/merge soon, a ScrambleSuit client), and it even is easy to run
bridges on ports < 1024 without messing with port forwarding.
Basket is still a research project and non-researchers shouldn't deploy
it because the wire format may change (and it consumes a hilarious
amount of bandwidth).
We should probably come up with some easy instructions for operators
of Tor Bridge relays who are running Debian stable, such as adding an
Apt pin to pull in only the obfs4proxy package and its dependencies
from Debian jessie and keep everything else pinned to stable. If
someone has done this, or has another simple solution, would you mind
writing up some short how-to on the steps you took, please?
[0]:
http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-anonymity-tools/Week-of-Mon-20150202/001119.html
[1]: https://github.com/yawning/basket
All of obfs4proxy's dependencies are build time. The binary is
statically linked because that's what Go does. David S.'s ansible-tor
package does it like this:
https://github.com/david415/ansible-tor/commit/f897581daa79389ddcb28c7dae601473e85e8226
So the documentation should be a matter of "how to setup the apt pin
for a single package". I've heard someone complaining about the tor
AppArmor profile but that also isn't something I've dealt with ever.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
[0]: I just scp the binary to my bridge whenever I need to update it,
and my idea of how to update all my linux systems starts with "pacman"
and not "apt-get".
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