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Re: [tor-relays] Feedback




On 26 Feb 2016, at 11:52, Random Tor Node Operator <tor@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On 26.02.2016 05:15, torserver@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
 * Next, i noticed a frequent (daily) behavior of the Tor server
   dropping traffic to around zero. Inspecting this, let me to
   understand, my provider was disconnecting me and reassigning a new
   IP on a daily basis, which took some time to propagate. Even worse:
   It did not propagate on its own, i needed to restart the tor service
   to reinitialise...


Instead of a Tor Relay, you can operate a Tor Bridge, perhaps with obfs4.
A regularly changing IP address is less of a problem for bridges. It may
even be of advantage. Once its IP address gets blacklisted by
adversarial actors, you already have a new one.

But how do users find that new address?
(For some users, the bridge authority might tell them when provided with the bridge's fingerprint, but only if their other bridges work.)

(Of course they could
still simply block the whole /16 or whatever your ISP has)

Typically only the IP and port are blocked.

Tim

Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP 968F094B

teor at blah dot im
OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F

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