On 02/28/2016 06:57 PM, Moritz Bartl wrote: > The risks for seizures of exit relays are also minimal. What can happen > if you run them as individual is that the police comes with a warrant > and raids you because they assume you were the criminal (and then later > return everything and the case against you is dropped since running an > exit itself is legally just fine), but I haven't heard of any case like > that in the past years. They have all seemed to have learned what Tor > is, and all they do sometimes is ask for 'subscriber information' (which > you don't have). Exactly. They all seem to have a general understanding of what Tor is and maybe a bit about how it works. It's been my experience that law enforcement will send an inquiry, be told by the ISP that it's an exit node, they realize the difficulty of tracing the original source, and then nothing more (at least from our perspective) will happen. That of course depends on the country, its laws, and the technical skills of any interested law enforcement. Follow that blog post that shows how to set up your exit to minimize harassment. The ISP can easily set a reverse DNS entry, and you eliminate a significant amount of spam and attacks by using a reduced exit policy, especially if you get rid of the standard ports for SSH and Telnet traffic. A custom landing page doesn't hurt either; mine looks like this: http://198.50.200.131/ -- Jesse V
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