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Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information



Whatever you decide, I think you should have this mentioned in the setup docs for bridges.

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-------- Original Message --------
 On February 8, 2018 6:53 AM, Karsten Loesing <karsten@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>On 2018-02-08 12:19, nusenu wrote:
>>
>>>Possible advantages are:
>>>another advantage I can come up with:
>> we will be able to analyze bridge shares (if most have contactInfo set), meaning
>> is one or two entity running all bridges? How many operators are there?
>>Obviously you could also see this as disadvantage.
>>
> Makes sense. I'd count that as advantage. We're not trying to hide who's
> running a bridge. We're just trying to hide where bridges are located,
> so that they're harder to block.
>
>>When discussing bridge IP:port secrecy it is probably worth noting
>> that IP:port information of about 2k bridges (that is most bridges) got published
>> last Sept. 2017 (see metrics-team mailing list post from Oct. 2017).
>> I'm not saying that we should not try to keep hiding that information.
>>
> Just to give enough context for folks on this list, it wasn't us who
> published that information, it was a group of researchers.
>
>https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/metrics-team/2017-October/000489.html
>
> All the best,
> Karsten
>
>
>tor-relays mailing list
>tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>

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