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Re: [tor-relays] Fwd: Tor family graphs



True, but unless one family controls a large part of the network (which
is bad even with the current system), this is barely worse than an
attacker flooding the current network with new relays in a family. I
believe what you describe is possible in the current system as well.

The only thing I can imagine that would make a "FamilyName" system
problematic would be if a lot of people left a default or something like
"FamilyName family".


On 07/22/2015 04:33 PM, nusenu wrote:
> 
> 
>> Out of curiosity, what is the need for ensuring a node cannot be
>> put into a family without its consent? What would be wrong with,
>> say, a FamilyName directive? Set the same FamilyName on each node
>> you control, and routes will avoid multiples.
> 
> That would give an adversary the ability to reduce the likelihood of
> your relays being chosen in a path by adding many relays to your
> family (without requiring your consent).. and probably many other things.
> 
> 
> 
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