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Re: [tor-relays] >23% Tor exit relay capacity found to be malicious - call for support for proposal to limit large scale attacks



I have nothing against this proposal although im not sure it would be that much efficient.
Especially, how does it make relay operations 'less sustainable' or 'more risky'?

@Imre Jonk: why would you want - and why should you have - an higher probability?
Sounds to me the ideal case is an infinite amount of independent exits with an almost-zero probability.

C

On Mon, Jul 6, 2020 at 12:28 AM Felix <zwiebel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Hi nusenu

Thank's you for your encouraging efforts to keep things safe.

Am 05.07.2020 um 18:35 schrieb nusenu:
> To prevent this from happening over and over again
> I'm proposing two simple but to some extend effective relay requirements
> to make malicious relay operations more expensive, time consuming,
> less sustainable and more risky for such actors

Is an issue real or not? Any answer to that question does not contradict
a substantial method. Right, the proposed measure is not against
sneek-in attackers but it buys time to detect and tackle sudden issues.
Let's move forward. I hear you.

--
Cheers, Felix
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