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Re: [tor-relays] >23% Tor exit relay capacity found to be malicious - call for support for proposal to limit large scale attacks



On 12.07.2020 14:40, Charly Ghislain wrote:

However I think it would be preferable to keep as much as possible the open
design at the network level.
Anything trying to build a web of trust should be completely separate, for
instance published white and blacklists.
Authorities flagging relays with verified email or physical addresses could
publish their lists, and this could
be used by the clients with the default configuration.
But no single relay - however bad someone thinks it is - should be kicked
off the network by the network itself.
Especially not on the basis of individual human decisions.
+1

Currently each user tinkers with his own white- & blacklist. ;-)
Long lists are created in bitcoin forums with EntryNodes, ExitNodes, ExcludeNodes & ExcludeExitNodes.


By the way:
Your relay can be an exit from day 1. But get a guard flag only after 2 weeks or later, if the authorities put it at all. ;-)

--
╰_╯ Ciao Marco!

Debian GNU/Linux

It's free software and it gives you freedom!
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