Re: [tor-relays] first using bridge then become bridge (On chinese SSL MITM)

["Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)" <lists@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On 3/9/11 2:56 PM, Lorenz Kirchner wrote:
>> This this:
>> https://sites.google.com/a/infosecurity.ch/testst/
>>
> no, same problem
> 
> ...connection interrupted...

Sounds interesting that they are doing SSL MiTM probably because they
have control of some rough chinese-government-affiliated CA
certification authority.

May i ask you, being in china, to go https://spreadsheet.google.com and
report via email which are the SSL digital certificate information that
you read?

From Europe i see in the certificate information
SHA1 Fingerprint (last digits are DC:8E:74:12:93)
Serial (last digits are 00:00:22:63)

The Root Certificate have as chain:
EquifaxSecureCA: C = US, O = Equifax, OU = Equifax Secure Certificate
Authority
That signed the Google CA:
GoogleInternetAuthority: C = US, O = Google Inc, CN = Google Internet
Authority


What do you see with your browser related to the digital certificate
parameters?

Maybe we can find which are the rough CA with which they can do Deep
Packet Inspection?

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