Re: [tor-relays] Should new exit relays be probed for public DNS resolvers

Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Should new exit relays be probed for public DNS resolvers

From: Alec Muffett <alec.muffett@xxxxxxxxx>

Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2020 06:59:16 +0000

Delivery-date: Thu, 05 Mar 2020 02:26:59 -0500

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Hey Nathaniel,

What's your threat model here? What would you want to achieve?

On Wed, 4 Mar 2020, 17:24 Nathaniel Suchy, <nathanielsuchy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

There has been discussion over the past several years that the Tor network should not use public DNS resolver as it has security implications on the Tor network (https://medium.com/@nusenu/who-controls-tors-dns-traffic-a74a7632e8ca). Should new Tor Exit Relays be probed and not included in the consensus until they're running their own DNS resolver and not relying on a public one?
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