Re: [tor-relays] Ops request: Deploy OpenVPN terminators

[grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx>]

On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 8:40 PM, Andy Isaacson <adi@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Anecdotally, the GFW blocks OpenVPN endpoints as well.

You need to specify context... access *to* ovpn nodes?, which
is moot because that is not the deployment specified here in
diagram... you already guaranteed access via the localhost exit
you can already reach, (or via the exit op's clear forward path to
their off exit box ovpn node). Or *from* ovpn nodes?... well as
before, if your node is in gfw area trying to get out, or is outside
trying to get in, it really doesn't matter, gfw will block exit or ovpn
as it will.

So, this is not about such gfw things. It's about enabling
quite some other users other means to get around silly ip
based blocklists derived from the consensus, the tor dns query
thing, or poor management models by the site the user wishes
to access, etc. We provide tor exits exact so users can get
around stuff, so adding in an ovpn on a spare ip is no
philosophical difference there. Yes, it is a fuck you to old way
of playing nice by saying "here's all our public nodes, block us",
and it might cost $few more a month for the ip, and eat some
cpu on localhost, but that's about it. If it helps some users
it's worth doing, to each operators own desire.

Same goes for binding/routing your tor exit out a different ip
than your OR ip. Except that using OpenVPN can permit
other protocols for help of user than only TCP.
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