Hi, thanks everybody for your replies. On 30/05/2017 15:52, dawuud wrote: > Is there a clear threat model justifying use of disk encryption here? On 30/05/2017 15:52, dawuud wrote:> The decryption keys sit in system memory so an adversary with physical > access will surely win. I just don't see the point. On 30/05/2017 20:30, tor wrote: > I also don't understand the point of encrypting this directory. On 30/05/2017 20:40, diffusae wrote: > Me too not. > > If the machine is running, the content is always unencrypted. On 31/05/2017 02:41, teor wrote: > On a relay, the most sensitive content is in DataDir/keys. > You could encrypt that if you want to protect your keys when your > relay is powered off. I was asking mostly out of curiosity, I do not have a specific threat in mind, but I was following the scenario "node is seized" like it has recently happened for some of the relays and was announced on this list[1a][1b]. My relays are running as VPSes on a third-party provider, so - yeah - they are exposed to attacks from the providers themselves. But I have to trust them in any case, anyhow, don't I? I understand that what I am getting is very limited. It basically works if the provider decides to shut down the machine or I am able to shut down the machine before it is seized/analysed. And again, if I know (i.e. I am notified) that the machine is seized, whether it is running or not I can always write here to ask that node to be cut out of the network. So, the difference is that *if* the machine is shut down before it is inspected then I just have a little more time to ask for the node to be removed. Is this correct? In the end, probably this is quite some hassle for very little gain. On 31/05/2017 02:41, teor wrote: > Or you could use OfflineMasterKey for the ed25519 keys, which is > even safer. (But doesn't do anything for the RSA keys.) I will probably set up the OfflineMasterKey (I still have a couple of questions, see the other thread). > I wouldn't bother encrypting the entire DataDir, it contains > consensuses and descriptors, and (as of 0.3.1) will contain consensus > diffs and compressed consensuses, so it will get a bit larger. > > The most sensitive part is probably the state file, but a relay's > guards are not that sensitive. Encrypting the whole DataDir seemed to me the only viable configuration given that in torrc you can only specify where the DataDir is. Cristian [1a]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-May/012281.html [1b]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-May/012406.html
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