On Wed, May 09, 2018 at 10:18:10AM +0200, Martin Kepplinger wrote:
> On 2018-05-08 16:59, Jonathan Marquardt wrote:
> > On Tue, May 08, 2018 at 04:45:58PM +0200, Martin Kepplinger wrote:
> > > How does a usable ipset (hash:ip,port) look like, so that it is a whitelist
> > > for
> > > in/out tcp connections? *Everything* else from/to the outside world is
> > > assumed
> > > to be dropped. (DNS too).
> > >
> > > * dir auths from src/or/auth_dirs.inc
> > > * fallback dirs from scripts/maint/fallback.whitelist
> > > * current guard relays (parsed from a consensus file)
> > >
> > > anything else?
> >
> > There isn't really a standard port for the ORPort or the DirPort. All kinds of
> > ports are used for this. For example, you could only allow port 443 and you
> > would be good to go, just not for all relays.
> >
> > In theory, you could create a giant iptables ruleset for every relay out
> > there, which you would have to update all the time, because it changes every
> > day.
>
> That's not really a problem with ipset. My list above results in about 2800
> entries (ip,port combinations). I could easily update it hourly. Starting
> tor-browser doesn't yet work though, and while I might simply still get
> iptables rules wrong, I thought I'd ask if I miss addresses.
>
> Allowing local connections is necessary for the control port, and not an
> issue. It's about remote tcp connections.
Well, you really only need to allow TCP connections to all the guard nodes on
their ORPorts and the connections to the fallback dir. That's it.
Maybe check your firewall's logs?
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