Thanks for creating this tool - it looks like a great way for operators to keep an eye on their relay. But I wonder about the privacy implications of making a relay's high-resolution bandwidth figures public. For example, attacker can correlate a traffic-based attack on a hidden service, with a traffic peak on its Guards. (I am not sure if any similar attack applies to Exits, or any other role Exits may have.) We previously moved to a bandwidth statistics interval of 6 hours for this reason. (That's why the 3 days and 1 month bandwidth graphs are empty on Globe.) You lose a certain amount of precision moving to a graph, rather than reporting exact figures in a data file. But I'm not sure if that's enough to avoid the attack I described above. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F |
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