Georg Koppen:
Jonas via tor-relays:Where is this criteria documented?I am not sure what criteria you mean but we have our bad-relay criteria[1] documented at our wiki and keep fingerprints we reject due to attacks we noticed there as well[2].It seems the tor project, or its designated volunteers, are increasing controlling and managing the network. In the Swiss Federation and EU this turns the tor project into an "online service provider" or "online platform" and subjects one to all sorts of regulations and compliance regimes.We already get enough requests from the police regarding relays hosted in our datacenters. Shall we point them at tor as the network operator?The Tor Project is not running the network.
There is an additional point that is important here that I forgot (sorry for that and thanks to a little bird reminding me): yes, we working on hunting malicious relays tracked some of those relays for a while which I mentioned in my previous mail and we reached out to some of their operators. However, the relays did not got rejected by us at the end of the day, but rather by a majority of directory authorities.
Those authorities are a central part of our project, too, but I think it's important to point out that the "we" in my original mail was supposed to point to different groups within the Tor Project which might not have been clear enough.
Georg
It's comprised of relays run mostly by volunteers. I am actually not really sure either what you are proposing to be honest. Shall we just keep the relays attacking our users in the network instead?Georg [snip][1] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Criteria-for-rejecting-bad-relays [2] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Rejected-fingerprints-found-in-attacks---------- Original Message ----------On Wed, November 10, 2021 at 8:59 AM, Georg Koppen<gk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:Hello everyone! Some of you might have noticed that there is a visible drop of relays on our consensus-health website.[1] The reason for that is that we kicked roughly 600 non-exit relays out of the network yesterday. In fact, only a small fraction of them had the guard flag, so the vast majority were middle-only relays. We don't have any evidence that these relays were doing any attack, but there are attacks possible which relays could perform from the middle position. Therefore, we decided we'd remove those relays for our users' safety sake. _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
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