On 16 Oct (10:49:43), nusenu wrote: > lets see when this graph stops growing > https://cryptpad.fr/code/#/2/code/view/1uaA141Mzk91n1EL5w0AGM7zucwFGsLWzt-EsXKzNnE/present/ To help you out here for this line: "2020-10-15 ?? first Tor dir auths change KISTSchedRunInterval from 10 to 2" These are the 3 authorities that notified us with the change along with the most accurate timestamp I have timestamp: longclaw -> Oct 14 at 16:05:08 UTC moria1 -> Oct 14 before 16:00 UTC (exact consensus time is unknown, would need to dig in the votes but Roger said it was changed on moria "earlier today" that is before this time.) bastet -> Oct 15 at 15:26:47 UTC Three are needed consensus on parameters so the Oct 15th 16:00 UTC is the first consensus to see the change. Keep in mind that it would take at maximum ~2h for ALL relays to get that change. > > > why is this relevant? > It puts more entities into an end-to-end correlation position than there used to be > https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/#tor-relay-operators-in-end-to-end-correlation-position > > and it might also decrease exit traffic on exits when a tor client chooses an exit as guard It was pointed out by Jaym on IRC, notice here a bump in Exit capacity around mid September: http://rougmnvswfsmd4dq.onion/bandwidth-flags.html?start=2020-08-18&end=2020-10-16 That could likely be a reason for this sudden change in probabilities. Now, _maybe_ the KIST change, which in theory increases bw throughput, allowed those Exit to push more traffic and thus might help with increasing that Guard+Exit probability we are seeing in your graph. Lets keep a close eye on your graph! Thanks! David -- 7h1/NAPdaaGpI8WG6X4FtryAZZ4EhnznUVVLqIf/04A=
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