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[tor-relays] Re: Ebury 1.8.3 on two Quetzalcoatl relay servers: timeline, lessons, open questions



On Wednesday, 7 October 2026 18:03:57 CEST George via tor-relays wrote:
> On 10/7/26 11:20, Jonathan D. Proulx via tor-relays wrote:

>> Thanks for the excellent write up.
+1

> > One of our key remediations which you didn't mention was adding
> > multifactor authenitcation (MFA) to our ssh, so even if a password or
> > key leaks that's no longer sufficient.
> > 
> > Nothing is perfect but MFA seems like a substantial mitigation to the
> > typical Ebury vector.
>
> * protect your private SSH keys as if they're the physical keys to you
> residence

> * ed25519 is the key type you should use, but with OpenSSH 10.3 you can
> start using mldsa44-ed25519, which is apparently post-quantum
> cryptanalysis proof:

I hope NitroKey and OnlyKey will be able to do that via a firmware upgrade at 
some point.

> And just to be clear, passwd-protected SSH keys is not considered
> multi-factor authentication (MFA)... MFA would require another factor
> besides "what you have" in the private key. The passwd is just
> protecting usage of the private key. MFA would mean Yubikey, TOTP, etc.

+1
FIDO/U2F hardware authenticator support was added in OpenSSH version 8.2
~4 Years ago.

Because I know from the last visit by the cops that I only have 1-2 seconds 
;-)
SSH keys on a PIN-protected and self-destructing OnlyKey.¹

https://gist.github.com/boldsuck/905c2c01e596e5673340216089366b76

¹(Standard, 6 physical buttons)

-- 
╰_╯ Ciao Marco!

Debian GNU/Linux

It's free software and it gives you freedom!

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