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[tor-relays] Re: Family-ID for bridges



On Wednesday, 16 September 2026 16:51 Alexander Hansen Færøy via tor-relays wrote:
> I just spoke with Mike about this topic. For now, our advice is for
> operators to split their families into two: one family for their bridges
> and one family for their non-bridge relays (guard, middle, and exit nodes).

Thanks Alex, I did it that way.

On Monday, 14 September 2026 23:33 Roger Dingledine via tor-relays wrote:
> * When clients use public Tor relays, the clients don't fetch the full
> relay descriptors, so they can't see and verify the family-cert lines
> from those relays, and that's why the directory authorities need to do
> the verification and vouching. But for bridges, clients do fetch the
> full bridge descriptor, so they can see the family-cert line themselves.
> 
> * So (as I understand it) there weren't and won't be any changes needed
> on Serge.
> 
> * But I don't know if anybody actually programmed the part where clients
> read the family-cert themselves and take it into account along with
> the family-ids lines they see in relay microdescriptors. I suspect they
> didn't, because of the design concern that Mike raised.
> 
> * You could test this yourself, in practice, by configuring your client
> to use a bridge that sets its family-cert, and watching your logs to
> see whether your client notices it.

OK, all my public bridges have had a family-key for about two weeks now.

root@boldsuck:~# grep Bridge /var/lib/tor-instances/*/bridgelines
a few dozen in Tor Browser 15.0.24 / Debian 13 (trixie)
unfortunately nothing to see in logs :-)

...
2026-10-11 19:10:25.665
[NOTICE] Bridge 'ForPrivacyNETbr52' has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address. Will prefer using its IPv4 address (203.0.113.52:1234) based on the configured Bridge address.
2026-10-11 19:10:25.665
[NOTICE] new bridge descriptor 'ForPrivacyNETbr52' (fresh): $fingerprint~ForPrivacyNETbr52 [fingerprint-ed25519] at 203.0.113.52 and [2001:db8::1:123]
...

or Onionoo:
https://onionoo.torproject.org/details?search=ForPrivacyNETbr

or Collector:
https://collector.torproject.org/recent/bridge-descriptors/
family-cert   EMPTY

Metrics:
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/ForPrivacyNETbr
Family Certificate   none

I need to revert Bridges to `ciissversion:2`. Nusenu can't read the
family-cert's anywhere, either. ;-)

In German, we say: 'Das war für Nüsse'
(That was a waste of time.)

> * I don't see any downside to adding your family-cert to your
> bridge. Clients may or may not know how to honor it yet, but that's
> their problem, not your problem.
> 
> * If C-Tor clients turn out to not have that feature yet (i.e. to not
> know how to incorporate bridge family certs), it's reasonable to expect
> that it will be a long while if ever before they get that support,
> since we're focusing lately on LLM-derived security reports. But if
> Arti doesn't have the feature yet, that sounds to me like a legitimate
> feature request that the Arti people might be interested in.

I don't have arti running, but I can send bridgelines to a trusted person
for testing.

-- 
╰_╯ Ciao Marco!

Debian GNU/Linux

It's free software and it gives you freedom!

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