Two main defenses we've found successful across ~800 guard relays the last 5 months of the various attacks: 1) Over provision CPU and RAM Few cores available per relay and enough RAM to let a few relays spike from 16-30GB (max we've seen is 90GB for one relay). 2) Use mimallc to return the freed RAM faster than glibc, avoiding OOM more often Swap can help temporarily until mimallc frees the RAM Worse case, in torrc set dircache 0 . Will remove the relay from guard and HSDir flags and the majority of the attacks. Still able to serve traffic and contribute to Tor with less stress on the server resources. Few blogs with more details from the beginning of the June and July attacks, which are still ongoing: https://1aeo.com/blog https://1aeo.com/blog/tor-dos-year-under-flood-2025-2026.html -------- Original Message -------- On Thursday, 10/15/26 at 06:12 boldsuck via tor-relays <tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: On Thursday, 15 October 2026 14:45:26 CEST boldsuck via tor-relays wrote: > Enable 'Rate limiting at the Introduction Points' for your Hidden Services. > This helps the entire network. > > ## HiddenService options are per onion service: > ## https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/advanced/dos/ > HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSDefense 1 ... https://archive.torproject.org/websites/lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2024-June/021674.html -- ╰_╯ Ciao Marco! Debian GNU/Linux It's free software and it gives you freedom!_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list -- tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to tor-relays-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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