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Re: [tor-relays] oniontip.com



Donncha O'Cearbhaill:
> Thanks everyone for all the feedback I've received about OnionTip. It
> was originally created in a rush during a hackathon so there is
> definitely room for improvement.
> 
> Mike Perry, as Mike Cardwell has said, it is currently possible to
> select a subset of relays to receive donations by using the filters
> (Country, Exit flag, Guard flag) at the the top of the OnionTip page.
> I'd like to expand these filters and maybe tweak the defaults to provide
> a greater share to exits. Exit bandwidth is more valuable to the
> network, and I believe it should be incentivised accordingly.

Ah, it was in no way clear to me that I was actually restricting my
donation to these nodes as opposed to just viewing them. I suppose I may
be dense, but I expect many others will think similarly, especially
since the UI for selection says "Only show ..." and not "Only donate to
...".

> I completely agree that it's important the service and its payments are
> externally auditable. From an implementation point of view, when a user
> filters a particular set of relays and clicks the donate button, a new
> bitcoin keypair and address is derived and stored in the database along
> with the list of relays they've selected. Creating a new address for
> each donation is the simplest way of ensuring a users donation goes to
> the correct set of relays they select. Forwarding the donation directly
> from that one-time-use address to the receiving relay operators also
> allows the user to easily and immediately confirm on the blockchain that
> their donation was forwarded correctly.

Ah, I see. Ok. Makes sense.

> From an external point of view, next week I'll add a page to the site
> where anyone can view all previously sent transactions. I'll also
> publish the master public key which corresponds to the addresses I'm
> generating along with a script to confirm they are being generated
> without any tricks.

Ok. I can't speak for everyone at Tor, but I think this kind of
verifiability is what will make it much easier for us to agree to add a
link to OnionTip on our donations page.
 
> There's a few other issues in the current implementation which I have
> outlined on the Github repo
> (https://github.com/DonnchaC/oniontip/issues). I'll send a post to the
> list early next week with my proposed solutions and and look for some
> feedback before I implement them.

Great! Keep us in the loop.
 

-- 
Mike Perry

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