Donncha O'Cearbhaill: > Thanks everyone for all the feedback. I'm delighted to see OnionTip is > being used and that relay operators are getting some (usually token) > appreciation. > > Mike, I've taken on board all the feedback you gave to this list on 2nd > September. I've just pushed some changes. There is now a listing of all > previous transactions sent from OnionTip, their size and the number or > relays they have selected to pay.[1] > > The number of selected relays gives a rough indication of how many > people are just paying the default (to all the relays) or are setting > their own criteria. > > I've also published a Python script to validate the transactions > completely from the blockchain based on the seed I use to generate > addresses [2]. > > I'm open to all suggests for a better distribution strategy. At the > moment I definitely think the incentive is somewhat wrong when someone > gets a much larger share by running a middle relay in a cheap bandwidth > location than someone running a smaller exit in a geographical diversity > location. > > As most people seem to use the defaults, for a start I'm going to add an > option so that Exits receive a premium on their bandwidth share by > default (maybe 1.5-2x). > > If there are any particular questions anyone has about the data or > donations so far, I'm happy to pull the data from the DB and try to > answer them. For one, I'm going to try find out how many relays had > bitcoin address listed in their first day or two. Maybe it can give an > indication how many new relay operators are being pulled in because of > OnionTip. > > Thanks again for all the feedback so far. I look forward to seeing what > we can do to improve OnionTip, and to continue supporting the growth of > the Tor network. > > Regards, > Donncha > > [1] https://oniontip.com/transactions > [2] > https://github.com/DonnchaC/oniontip/blob/master/scripts/payment-check.py Thank you for publishing these scripts! I think the most important thing right now is for us to be able to easily tell what the system is doing, and I think you have done that. As for what the default *should* be, I think we may want to think about that for a bit depending on what we think we want to encourage in the network. If we get an idea as to if Exits are actually more expensive to run than non-Exits, we can use that to guide these bonuses. Thanks a lot for OnionTip! It's now got my vote for inclusion on the Tor donations page! > On Sun, 2014-09-28 at 02:32 -0700, Mike Perry wrote: > > Thomas White: > > > Hmmm... appears to be have been upgraded since I last checked then > > > (which was only a few weeks ago!). Nicely done oniontip. I stand > > > corrected. > > > > Well, my original ask was for everyone to be able to verify that all > > 12.36 BTC that oniontip has received (as of right now) has actually been > > distributed how the users have asked. > > > > I suppose that since individual users can easily inspect that their > > donation has gone to the relays they selected (by looking at > > blockchain.info for their one-time use address), it is unlikely that the > > system will get away with cheating for long. But it is still hard for a > > new donor to tell if any other donors have been swindled recently, using > > simple blockchain inspection. They basically have to click around on the > > individual relay recipient keys to make sure everything looks legit. > > > > This makes me nervous in terms of endorsement. I can easily see hundreds > > of users getting swindled before one of them suddenly realizes that > > there is an extra bitcoin address in their transactions that is not in > > the original relay list they selected, or that the actual bitcoin > > distribution was slightly different than what they selected. If all > > users could inspect all donations easily, this type of compromise would > > be found quicker. > > > > Ideally, it would be possible to verify all of these questions (and many > > more) with only the blockchain. For instance, a comment in the bitcoin > > transaction could indicate the OnionTip options selected, and a single > > page on the website could allow us to view all donations to the system. > > > > > > Beyond this, I think there are actually interesting sociological > > questions we could answer with easy access to the OnionTip donation data > > and option selection. I'm very curious how donors are choosing to > > distribute their Bitcoin to the relays. > > > > For instance: > > > > 1. Is OnionTip encouraging the type of network diversity we want? Do we > > want to suggest changes to the default donation mode to encourage > > better diversity? > > > > 2. UI is still confusing to me. Is this UI causing people to prefer a > > certain type of donation over others, where they probably shouldn't? > > > > a. Is anyone actually using the Guard or Exit filters? If not, this > > means my super-cheap and unreliable FDC middle node will probably > > get me more OnionTip donations than either a more stable Guard > > node, or a more hassle-prone Exit node. This seems like an > > undesirable way to incentivize relay operation. Is it happening? > > Or are most people selecting Guard+Exit? > > > > b. Are people taking advantage of the country selection dialog? Are > > they doing it in a way that is favoring underrepresented countries? > > Or are people just choosing countries based on the next World Cup > > match, the current Olympic gold medal count leader, or some other > > crazy notion that seems to make little sense to network diversity? > > > > 3. What are big donors doing? Do they always select the default choice? > > > > a. If so, we should think waaay harder about what this choice is. > > > > b. If not, what do they want? Do they like specific or strange > > countries? Do they like countries with the fewest relays? With the > > lowest current bandwidth? With the best laws? Do we agree with > > their choices, and want to make it easier for other donors to make > > them too? Or should we be concerned, and try to encourage other > > behavior? > > > > c. Maybe only big donors get scammed with extra BTC destination > > addresses or a different transaction entirely? How can I see if > > other recent big donors have been scammed? > > > > > > > > > > > On 28/09/2014 03:28, Ed Carter wrote: > > > > The process is completely transparent. All Bitcoin transactions > > > > are viewable by the public on the Bitcoin blockchain. The Bitcoin > > > > addresses are posted by the relay operators themselves in their > > > > contact info on their relay. I can confirm that I receive > > > > donations made to the address I posted on my relay. > > > > > > > > My relay: > > > > https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/3C49A7D9BEBC668352F627CE60B1FE9B628DD2EA > > > > > > > > Blockchain.info web page showing donations received to my > > > > address: > > > > http://blockchain.info/address/1GXZVChXoxgrBzqMsCrWGu2ua6VTKSH6U1 > > > > > > > >> My concern (which has been highlighted before by Mike Perry) is > > > >> that the site lacks accountability and transparency. There is no > > > >> way to verify the donations actually reach the operators. > > > > _______________________________________________ > > tor-relays mailing list > > tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > -- > PGP: 7EFB DDE8 FD21 11AE A7BE 1AA6 3B0D 706A 7FBF ED86 > > This e-mail should be PGP signed, which allows you to verify its > authenticity. If it isn't, it may be fake. Check with me! Feel free to > encrypt anything you send to me using my key. > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays -- Mike Perry
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