> > Hi, > > > > I just had an idea, how an attacker could slow down the Tor network, > > and wanted it to discuss with you. > > To my knowledge, there is only the BadExit and BadDirectory flag, > > nothing like BadNode. > > In contrast to a bad exit, which is misbehaving, how could the network > > block a node, which has all outgoing traffic blocked? > > Lets say, I set up some (few hundred or so) Nodes, which I start up > > and then block outgoing traffic on them. If they're chosen as middle > > node for a circuit, the circuit can't build, because the next server > > cannot be reached. > > If my servers advertise a high bandwidth (is there any detection for > > false bandwidth advertisings?), Tor will often try to put them in a > > circuit, and often will fail. This could lead to no usable circuit for > > several minutes. > > > > Let me know what you think! > > > > Thanks :) > > Dirauths can add nodes to their configuration to not add to the > directory at all. See AuthDirReject in tor's manpage. > > The other answer is that the bw auths will never manage to test > bandwidth succesfully. > > All the best > Sebastian > In addition to what Sebastian mentioned above, Tor nodes will drop and ignore circuits that take too long to build. Check the following config options: LearnCircuitBuildTimeout CircuitBuildTimeout Rob
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