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[tor-talk] Circuit Fingerprinting Attacks: Passive Deanonymization of Tor Hidden Services

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Subject: [tor-talk] Circuit Fingerprinting Attacks: Passive Deanonymization of Tor Hidden Services
From: Jon Tullett <jon.tullett@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2015 08:50:54 +0200
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Looks interesting. Has anyone reviewed it?

http://people.csail.mit.edu/devadas/pubs/circuit_finger.pdf
http://anongalactic.com/new-attack-on-tor-can-deanonymize-hidden-services-with-surprising-accuracy/

-J
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