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Tor 0.1.1.11-alpha is out



This is the eleventh development snapshot for the 0.1.1.x series.

This release implements entry guard nodes: it automatically chooses a
handful of entry nodes and sticks with them for all circuits. The logs
about entry guards are still pretty chatty, but hopefully that will help
us track down any problems. Please let us know whether it works for you.

The release also reduces directory bandwidth overhead substantially,
makes Tor servers with dynamic IP addresses useful again, and makes IRC
and IM connections over Tor more reliable.

Everybody who runs a hidden service should upgrade.

http://tor.eff.org/download.html

Changes in version 0.1.1.11-alpha - 2006-01-10
  o Crashes in 0.1.1.x:
    - Include all the assert/crash fixes from 0.1.0.16.
    - If you start Tor and then quit very quickly, there were some
      races that tried to free things that weren't allocated yet.
    - Fix a rare memory stomp if you're running hidden services.
    - Fix segfault when specifying DirServer in config without nickname.
    - Fix a seg fault when you finish connecting to a server but at
      that moment you dump his server descriptor.
    - Extendcircuit and Attachstream controller commands would
      assert/crash if you don't give them enough arguments.
    - Fix an assert error when we're out of space in the connection_list
      and we try to post a hidden service descriptor (reported by weasel).
    - If you specify a relative torrc path and you set RunAsDaemon in
      your torrc, then it chdir()'s to the new directory. If you HUP,
      it tries to load the new torrc location, fails, and exits.
      The fix: no longer allow a relative path to torrc using -f.

  o Major features:
    - Implement "entry guards": automatically choose a handful of entry
      nodes and stick with them for all circuits. Only pick new guards
      when the ones you have are unsuitable, and if the old guards
      become suitable again, switch back. This will increase security
      dramatically against certain end-point attacks. The EntryNodes
      config option now provides some hints about which entry guards you
      want to use most; and StrictEntryNodes means to only use those.
    - New directory logic: download by descriptor digest, not by
      fingerprint. Caches try to download all listed digests from
      authorities; clients try to download "best" digests from caches.
      This avoids partitioning and isolating attacks better.
    - Make the "stable" router flag in network-status be the median of
      the uptimes of running valid servers, and make clients pay
      attention to the network-status flags. Thus the cutoff adapts
      to the stability of the network as a whole, making IRC, IM, etc
      connections more reliable.

  o Major fixes:
    - Tor servers with dynamic IP addresses were needing to wait 18
      hours before they could start doing reachability testing using
      the new IP address and ports. This is because they were using
      the internal descriptor to learn what to test, yet they were only
      rebuilding the descriptor once they decided they were reachable.
    - Tor 0.1.1.9 and 0.1.1.10 had a serious bug that caused clients
      to download certain server descriptors, throw them away, and then
      fetch them again after 30 minutes. Now mirrors throw away these
      server descriptors so clients can't get them.
    - We were leaving duplicate connections to other ORs open for a week,
      rather than closing them once we detect a duplicate. This only
      really affected authdirservers, but it affected them a lot.
    - Spread the authdirservers' reachability testing over the entire
      testing interval, so we don't try to do 500 TLS's at once every
      20 minutes.

  o Minor fixes:
    - If the network is down, and we try to connect to a conn because
      we have a circuit in mind, and we timeout (30 seconds) because the
      network never answers, we were expiring the circuit, but we weren't
      obsoleting the connection or telling the entry_guards functions.
    - Some Tor servers process billions of cells per day. These statistics
      need to be uint64_t's.
    - Check for integer overflows in more places, when adding elements
      to smartlists. This could possibly prevent a buffer overflow
      on malicious huge inputs. I don't see any, but I haven't looked
      carefully.
    - ReachableAddresses kept growing new "reject *:*" lines on every
      setconf/reload.
    - When you "setconf log" via the controller, it should remove all
      logs. We were automatically adding back in a "log notice stdout".
    - Newly bootstrapped Tor networks couldn't establish hidden service
      circuits until they had nodes with high uptime. Be more tolerant.
    - We were marking servers down when they could not answer every piece
      of the directory request we sent them. This was far too harsh.
    - Fix the torify (tsocks) config file to not use Tor for localhost
      connections.
    - Directory authorities now go to the proper authority when asking for
      a networkstatus, even when they want a compressed one.
    - Fix a harmless bug that was causing Tor servers to log
      "Got an end because of misc error, but we're not an AP. Closing."
    - Authorities were treating their own descriptor changes as cosmetic,
      meaning the descriptor available in the network-status and the
      descriptor that clients downloaded were different.
    - The OS X installer was adding a symlink for tor_resolve but
      the binary was called tor-resolve (reported by Thomas Hardly).
    - Workaround a problem with some http proxies where they refuse GET
      requests that specify "Content-Length: 0" (reported by Adrian).
    - Fix wrong log message when you add a "HiddenServiceNodes" config
      line without any HiddenServiceDir line (reported by Chris Thomas).

  o Minor features:
    - Write the TorVersion into the state file so we have a prayer of
      keeping forward and backward compatibility.
    - Revive the FascistFirewall config option rather than eliminating it:
      now it's a synonym for ReachableAddresses *:80,*:443.
    - Clients choose directory servers from the network status lists,
      not from their internal list of router descriptors. Now they can
      go to caches directly rather than needing to go to authorities
      to bootstrap.
    - Directory authorities ignore router descriptors that have only
      cosmetic differences: do this for 0.1.0.x servers now too.
    - Add a new flag to network-status indicating whether the server
      can answer v2 directory requests too.
    - Authdirs now stop whining so loudly about bad descriptors that
      they fetch from other dirservers. So when there's a log complaint,
      it's for sure from a freshly uploaded descriptor.
    - Reduce memory requirements in our structs by changing the order
      of fields.
    - There used to be two ways to specify your listening ports in a
      server descriptor: on the "router" line and with a separate "ports"
      line. Remove support for the "ports" line.
    - New config option "AuthDirRejectUnlisted" for auth dirservers as
      a panic button: if we get flooded with unusable servers we can
      revert to only listing servers in the approved-routers file.
    - Auth dir servers can now mark a fingerprint as "!reject" or
      "!invalid" in the approved-routers file (as its nickname), to
      refuse descriptors outright or include them but marked as invalid.
    - Servers store bandwidth history across restarts/crashes.
    - Add reasons to DESTROY and RELAY_TRUNCATED cells, so clients can
      get a better idea of why their circuits failed. Not used yet.
    - Directory mirrors now cache up to 16 unrecognized network-status
      docs. Now we can add new authdirservers and they'll be cached too.
    - When picking a random directory, prefer non-authorities if any
      are known.
    - New controller option "getinfo desc/all-recent" to fetch the
      latest server descriptor for every router that Tor knows about.