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Re: [tor-talk] Risk of selectively enabling JavaScript
On Tue, 07 Jan 2014 12:58:49 +0000, Mark McCarron wrote:
...
> The fact that TBB disables javascript is a testimony to how bad the javascript coders of Firefox are.
Ex falso sequitur quodlibet.
> I think there is a solid argument for adding filters to the exit nodes that strip anything that could be used against a person and enforce default headers ,etc.
Why should it? The default user uses TBB, i.e. the filtering (of the
identical headers each TBB produces) can be done there as well.
The exit node doesn't even know that a) a given stream is a HTTP
connection, b) can't look at all into HTTPS, and c) has no way of knowing
that the user in question has clicked the don't-filter-me-button.
Andreas
--
"Totally trivial. Famous last words."
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@*.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2010 07:29:21 -0800
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