Bryan Ford: > Travis Biehn wrote: >> It was surprising (to me) that Chaum should be the one to produce the first >> of the modern 'solving the key escrow problem' algorithms. Academia has >> been ignoring this particular problem for quite a while - I expect that >> more proposed solutions will follow, solutions that will be more difficult >> to prove insecureâ > > Not quite true. Although itâs not a âhot topicâ in academia, we and a few others have written a few papers exploring privacy-preserving approaches to controlled, limited data collection for law enforcement. For example: > > - âRestructuring the NSA metadata programâ: http://outsourcedbits.org/2014/03/10/restructuring-the-nsa-metadata-program/ > - âSecure protocols for accountable warrant executionâ: https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/secure-protocols-for-accountable-warrant-execution/ > - âCatching Bandits and Only Bandits: Privacy-Preserving Intersection Warrants for Lawful Surveillanceâ: http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/dissent/papers/bandits-abs > > None of these papers really suggest or call for âkey escrowâ or âbackdoorsâ, especially not against general-purpose end-to-end encryption or mobile devices. But even so, this line of research understandably tends not to get much love either from many die-hard privacy purists. :) https://anon.inf.tu-dresden.de/publications/KWF2006ETRICSRevocableAnonymity.pdf is probably one, in the context of the AN.ON/JonDonym system. See as well: http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/sassaman-pet2008.pdf Georg
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