AntiTree: > If I were a betting person, a beer says that they will be summarizing the > current issues with hidden services, and as Adrian said, doing a client > side disbanding attack (e.g. Java + DNS) My own speculations is that they have used the attacks on guard relays described in the following blog post, maybe in combination with other attacks: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters They wanted a NDA, so most Tor Project's core contributors don't know what's in the air. Improving the situations of guard relays is tricky to get right. There's an open proposal in discussion: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/236-single-guard-node.txt It will also be a âhot topicâ at the next Privacy Enhancing Technology Symposium: https://www.petsymposium.org/2014/papers/Dingledine.pdf https://www.petsymposium.org/2014/hotpets.php -- Lunar <lunar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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