[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-talk] Why does requesting for bridges by email require a Yahoo or Gmail address?
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
The difficulty of obtaining a Riseup account may be prohibitive for a lot of people, especially if they need a bridge quickly for whatever reason. Anecdotally, I requested one under a different identity over a week ago and have yet to hear back. In some situations, that's an eternity, and while I'm sure it would go more quickly with an invite, that presupposes knowing someone who has one to offer.
As a side note, I'm always slightly surprised by how few mentions Zoho gets. They're nowhere near perfect, but compared to Google, Yahoo, and such, at least they don't mine your email for targeted advertising, they have a business model where the user is the customer, and their privacy policy is readable and honest ("we'll log your IP and fingerprint your browser to see where you go and what you do on our site, but we won't read your mail or follow you around the Internet"). http://www.zoho.com/privacy.html
On July 26, 2014 3:16:03 AM EDT, Mirimir <mirimir@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>On 07/25/2014 11:31 PM, grarpamp wrote:
>
><SNIP>
>
>> Do we underestimate the social net in oppressed that gives
>> them awareness of tor, and to obtain binary and share bridge
>> info in the first place?
>
>Maybe we do. But what about carelessness, poor judgment and the
>prevalence of informers? Wouldn't it be better to have a system that
>protected bridges by design?
>
>> Or that oppressor will not burn $cheap govt SIM and IP army
>> to get and block bridges from gmail to @getbridges?
>
>Right. Requiring hard-to-get email addresses does make it harder to get
>bridge IPs. But who does that impact the most, potential users or
>adversaries? Is there relevant evidence?
>
>> This is difficult.
>
>Indeed.
>
>Please excuse the repetition, but DNS-based fast flux (Proximax) with
>selection-based dropping of domain names associated with bridge
>blocking
>is the best possibility that I've seen. Rather than trying to prevent
>adversaries from joining the system, it recursively isolates based on
>behavior.
>
><SNIP>
>--
>tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
>https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
- --
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. And the cape.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: APG v1.1.1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=A/UT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk