Mirimir transcribed 1.1K bytes: > On 07/25/2014 11:31 PM, grarpamp wrote: > > <SNIP> > > > Do we underestimate the social net in oppressed that gives > > them awareness of tor, and to obtain binary and share bridge > > info in the first place? > > Maybe we do. But what about carelessness, poor judgment and the > prevalence of informers? Wouldn't it be better to have a system that > protected bridges by design? > > > Or that oppressor will not burn $cheap govt SIM and IP army > > to get and block bridges from gmail to @getbridges? > > Right. Requiring hard-to-get email addresses does make it harder to get > bridge IPs. But who does that impact the most, potential users or > adversaries? Is there relevant evidence? > > > This is difficult. > > Indeed. > > Please excuse the repetition, but DNS-based fast flux (Proximax) with > selection-based dropping of domain names associated with bridge blocking > is the best possibility that I've seen. Rather than trying to prevent > adversaries from joining the system, it recursively isolates based on > behavior. I actually like the rBridge design better. [0] [0]: https://people.torproject.org/~isis/papers/rBridge:%20User%20Reputation%20based%20Tor%20Bridge%20Distribution%20with%20Privacy%20Preservation.copy%20with%20notes.pdf -- ââ isis agora lovecruft _________________________________________________________ GPG: 4096R/A3ADB67A2CDB8B35 Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
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