Or unless you use something like http://www.ianonym.com, it was designed to defeat all forms of tracking/fingerprinting with the fake domain concept and hide your destination even with https.
Since it takes control over the whole web page, the js interactions are sandboxed with a script to "tame" the page, a prototype was working but maybe it's a bit too complicate...
Regards Le 29/07/2014 02:10, Joe Btfsplk a écrit :
On 7/28/2014 3:34 PM, Craw wrote:This is all interesting, but I'm still concerned that the use / non use / intermittent use of java script still stares TBB users in the face.-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Thank you for your answer! I've just thought a bit about various methods to prevent fingerprinting browser profile (incl. UA/screen resolution/time zone/fonts/etc.), and here is two ways I've found: a) all tor-users have the same browser profile b) all tor-users have random temporary browser profile In my opinion our current strategy to reduce among all tor-users fingerprintable differences is correct. In such case the only that can an attacker do to determine one user from other is their Tor IP address, but if you will often change between them it becomes impossible for the attacker. And for variant b), it's much easier to do. A lot of users connect to web-sites from one exit-relay and have the same Tor IP address, but different profiles. So even if you will randomly generate new profile every minute, you have your unique profile so the attacker can easily determine: this actions made by different users. In contrary, when everybody has the same profile, it's much harder to do.And it seems like the family secret no one wants to discuss.As outlined in the TBB FAQ, there are distinct drawbacks - no matter how js is approached. Whether it's always allowed, (almost) never allowed, or configured per site - all 3 have distinct cons.One problem is, there's no "ruling" from Tor devs. One reason for that is disabling it breaks lots of sites.But unless the MUCH greater amount of fingerprinting data that's available when JS * IS * enabled is not enough to be concerned about (I can't imagine that), then it may not matter how well * some *other data are concealed. Plus, unless you go to only a few sites that require no JS, you have to turn it on - at least some. But, enabling JS allows sites to get FAR more info & allows trackers to compare that fingerprint to other sites you visit (unless you change the fingerprint between each site).And supposedly leaving JS off (if possible) distinguishes you from other TBB users that leave NoScript at the default setting.
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