Re: [tor-talk] How easy are Tor hidden services to locate?

[grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx>]

>> Because of the content if the site (not child porn or gambling)
>
> Hidden services are definitely weaker than regular Tor circuits, a)
> because the adversary can induce them to speak, and b) because they stay
> at the same place over time. Mostly 'a'.
>
> That said, there are plenty of hidden services out there, and few
> stories of people breaking their anonymity by breaking Tor. So they're
> not foolproof for sure, but they're also not trivial to deanonymize.

There's non/offtopic breaks, such as host and user security.
False breaks, such as with documented design weaknesses... eg: timing.
And real breaks, such as 0-day against the daemon, protocol, or unknown
design weaknesses.

There are plenty of the first.
Few of the second, outside of the attack classes you'd find in the anonbib.
And hopefully any of the third have already made it to the changelog or
anonbib.

Does anyone recall a time in the past where a client or service was
actually at real risk due to something from the third?

> I'll turn it around, and ask "easy compared to what?"

Might as well add drugs to the OP's list. Those major services (eg: silkroad)...
a) have already been found and are still operating under whatever scheme
you wish
b) are impossibly (perhaps quite unbelievably) hard to find
c) are still there because no one's bothered to look, yet

> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/trip-report-tor-trainings-dutch-and-belgian-police
> A lot of it depends on your expected adversary, and on how much you care.

Some might consider locking down their guards.
Though if up against a PA that can watch them, that doesn't matter either.
Seems everyone's waiting for the canaries...
_______________________________________________
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk