Re: [tor-talk] Question about possible increased risk of censorship when running (the same) Tor node as a relay and later as a bridge

[Griffin Boyce <griffinboyce@xxxxxxxxx>]

The network is pretty visible.  China seems to actively be seeking out
bridges anyway [1] (and I would assume that this applies to other
oppressive countries as well). So if your bridge would otherwise be
private, rolling up a TorCloud instance instead is a solid choice.  If
you're running it from your home network, maybe check to see if your IP
address is the same as it was before (if possible)?

~Griffin

[1]
https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci12/how-great-firewall-china-blocking-tor

On Mon, May 20, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Kostas Jakeliunas
<kostas@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> has there been any discussion/research whether Tor bridges are more likely
> to get blacklisted in censored areas if they'd been first run as simple
> internal relays? The idea being, if a censorship system is fishing for Tor
> nodes so they can be blacklisted on a per-IP-address basis and an internal
> relay later on becomes a bridge but is using the same external IP address,
> I suppose it is possible that it might get automatically blacklisted. Say
> I'm a censor and I'm blacklisting all IPs found in the published
> consensuses. I discover that someone is trying to connect to an IP
> previously found on a consensus (and I recall all previous IPs) - I do not
> do DPI - and simply block the connection due to IP address match. In this
> case, it doesn't matter if the bridge could be found via bridgeDB, or if
> it's doing pluggable transports. Any known cases/reports where this is
> likely to have happened?
>
> The reason I'm asking is, I've been running an internal Tor relay and am
> considering making it to be an obfsproxy bridge; it would be the same IP
> address. Perhaps this is inefficient, i.e. it is likely to have already
> been blacklisted in many censored/important areas? I suppose it's also an
> interesting question in itself, and it would be interesting to do some
> experiments e.g. using OONI.
>
> Thanks for any input
> Kostas.
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>



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Technical Program Associate, Open Technology Institute
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