Re: Tor blocking german nodes

[blau <blaumeer@xxxxxxxxx>]

Marco A. Calamari ha scritto:
> The right question is "What the Chinese government
> or TLA's can do controlling at leat the 25%
> of network?"

Most of the Internet links wordlwide go through the US, so it makes
sense for US intelligence to tap it there (see recent AT&T taps with
Narus equipment).

As a Tor exit relay is an opportunity for tapping traffic, it makes
perfetc sense for China to setup Tor exit relays and gain competitive
advantage in analyzing that part of the network traffic.

China does not route a significant portion of internet traffic, it has
no foothold in any of the key data exchanges worldwide. Setting up a few
hundred exit relays in mainland China gets you instant insigth into
sensitive traffic worldwide.

(by the way, China could also set up exit relays in the US and
everywere, it's cheap)

Let's see if the design of Tor can cope with a challenge of such a scale.

My guess is that countries like China would rather be better served by
not disrupting the Tor network (with misleading exit policies,
connection timeouts etc) so that they can analyze the traffic that goes
through. Of course, they would make sure their own citizen could not
reach the Tor network themselves.

I would like the torproject website to be more explicit warning users
about privacy issues: don't do any cleartext authentication, don't do
any ssl authentication if you are not able to check the authenticity of
the certificates.

As for Germany, let's see what the german citizens do about this law,
there is still plenty of room for optimism.

Blau