On Fri, 13 Nov 2009, Andrew Lewman wrote:
Second, it sounds like you want to protect against a local attacker from seeing your traffic. If so, go to proxy.org, find an https:// or vpn-based provider and enjoy your encrypted protection against your local ISP seeing your destination. If you actually want anonymity, then use Tor as is, for it's designed to provide anonymity online by default.
Yes, but back to my thread hijack :)Let's say my protection model does indeed require Tor, but at the same time requires "more" speed.
Forcing Tor to only use fast nodes probably doesn't work, since those fast nodes are probably inundated just like the slow ones are. This also suggests that organic growth in the Tor network is not going to solve much of the speed problem in the near term... existing users will certainly use more and more traffic.
But lets say one sets up X Tor nodes in X different locales and configure my Tor to use one of those X for my entry, and one of those X for my exit ... I'm still throttled by my middle hop, but the odds are much higher in my favor, and I may only need to rebuild my connection once or twice to get an acceptable speed.
The question is, what values of X are required in order for correlation, etc., to not be laughable ?
(the assumption here is that I put my X Tor nodes on the actual Tor network, but reserve some percentage of their bandwidth exclusively for my own use ... so they look and act like actual Tor nodes ...)
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