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Re: [tor-talk] New Browser Bundle



On 07/11/11 02:32, Andrew Lewman wrote:
> I'd like to see someone do research that proves or disproves this fear that 
> javascript and cookies everywhere is hazardous to the anonymity of a tor user. 
> I don't know a better setting for noscript. I know what I use for settings 
> when I use the default TBB setup.  

The risks of traditional Netscape cookies are reasonably well
understood, and can be controlled. However because JS can tamper with
cookies the situation is more complicated than it seems.

The intuitive problem with JS is that it feels like the part of the core
browser architecture most likely to be vulnerable to a zero day attack.
I use fluffy language here deliberately. There's quite a jump from that
intuition to a falsifiable hypothesis, but it offers an explanation for
cautious behaviour.

NoScript offers other protections though which are more solid. Having
Flash and Java turned off by default would seem to be a Good Thingâ. And
it intercepts various XSS/XSRF and clickjacking techniques (i.e. the
known problems with JS). I think it's safe to say that these are an
anonymity issue, and it adds some weight to the intuitive feeling that
allowing untrusted JS is not a good idea.

An advantage of having JS blocked is that you'll be alerted if a page
suddenly has a script you didn't expect. It could have been injected
there somehow by an adversary. If you have scripts enabled globally
you're not going to notice.

Personally I think the above is reason enough to have an opt-in policy
for scripting. Yes, it's a slight hassle on sites that depend heavily on
JS, but it offers some reassurance that I won't be inadvertently handing
over my details to a third party.



Julian

-- 
3072D/D2DE707D Julian Yon (2011 General Use) <pgp.2011@xxxxxx>

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