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Re: [tor-talk] What happen if one create 2000 exit nodes for 6 hours?
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On 11/21/2011 10:14 AM, Damian Johnson wrote:
> Hi Fabio. What you're describing is a sybil attack. An attacker
> definitely *wouldn't* get a majority of the exit traffic for those
> destinations - clients weigh relay selection by heuristics reported
> by the bandwidth authorities. Those authorities take a long time to
> warm up to new relays, so it would take quite a bit of uptime
> before they'd start seeing a substantial chunk of traffic.
> Also, we'd get an alarm and cut them out of the consensus, for an
> example see...
> short summary: 747 exits suddenly appeared and were dropped from
> the consensus
> That said, smaller and slower sybil adversaries could go undetected
> so if you see something fishy then let us know! -Damian
> _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing
> list tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Good thing we trust Moritz, torservers.net is growing. :P
Disclaimer: I have spoken with Moritz in the past and is very aware of
these type of concerns and was making efforts to mitigate them.
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