On Sat, Nov 02, 2013 at 05:49:57AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Sat, Nov 02, 2013 at 02:45:51AM -0700, Andrea Shepard wrote: > > There's a whole circuit between the HS and the rendezvous point. You'd > > have the same problem as trying to deanonymize a client from a subverted > > exit node. > > Actually, technically, the analogy would be trying to deanonymize a > client from a subverted website. > > The Tor client running the hidden service picks its own three hops, > so it's > > HS -> Guard -> Middle -> Middle -> Rendpoint <- Middle <- Guard <- Client Ah! Silly me commenting without looking at the damn code... -- Andrea Shepard <andrea@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5
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