Re: [tor-talk] latest generation traffic confirmation attacks

[coderman <coderman@xxxxxxxxx>]

On 11/28/14, Mansour Moufid <mansourmoufid@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> ...
> They implemented new traffic confirmation attacks that cannot be
> detected by the end points, based on some radar techniques.  They
> don't mention it but the attacks can be implemented in real time.
>
> They can also decrease the false positive rate by increasing the
> bandwidth of the DSSS chip.  A patient enough attacker can have no
> false positives.


a multi-path wide socket datagram based stochastically re-ordered and
shaped transport overlay with optimized dependent link padding would
keep such a coding recoverable confirmation in the dark, indefinitely.
[citation needed]
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