David Vennik wrote: > Michael Tharp wrote: > ... >>> If a node has bandwidth accounting, it should not be listed as long >>> lived, because obviously it is likely to go down at any moment. I don't >>> know if it will make that much difference to persistent session use on >>> tor or not, but I think that it is only logical that bandwidth >>> accounting should flag a 'not long lived' flag on the server information >>> so that circuits to irc and ssh and other long lived connections don't >>> use it. i know this might 'reduce anonymity' through the weakening of >>> defenses against traffic analysis, but endless reconnections to irc >>> servers, in my experience, is annoying both to myself and to the endless >>> timeouts in the ORC which is exclusively tor-accessible. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> David Vennik >>> >> Doesn't tor already have this? Connections to certain ports (21, 22, 80 >> among others) that are typically reserved for long-lived connections >> will avoid nodes that have been up for less than a certain amount of time. >> > > you are missing my point. if a node has bandwidth accounting configured > it may stay up for a week but it could hibernate in five seconds. this > is not helpful for users of persistent connection based services. some > kind of flag on the server description suggesting that the server is > liable to go offline at any time would be very useful for preventing the > endless string of timeouts that using tor for these kinds of connections > causes. Why doesn't tor close the connection when the circuit fails? -- They who would give up essential Liberty to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty or Safety --Benjamin Franklin
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