Sean Alexandre: > In light of FoxAcid and the NSA hijacking traffic coming out of exit nodes [1], > I'm wondering about the possibilities for building counter measures into exit > nodes. To start it might be something as simple as bundling some type alternate > CA system such Convergence into exit nodes [2]. Have exit nodes compare what > they're seeing, and raise a flag if they see anything suspicious. We can't do that at the exit node level. This would mean snooping on the traffic relayed to perform extra verification. Even with good intents, looking at the traffic is a big no-no: legal protections given to exit node operators in most countries relies on not having knowledge of what goes through. -- Lunar <lunar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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