On Thu, 31 Oct 2013 17:59:39 +1030 DeveloperChris <developerchris@xxxxxxxxxxxx> allegedly wrote: > Could exit nodes act as caches. I know that would introduce a number > of issues including a compromised exit node revealing what was > retrieved by that node (but not whom for) so if it was limited to a > few popular 'safe' sites it could help alleviate those sites from > some of the traffic burden. > I think that might cause a few problems. Firstly, the obvious one of definitions. Define "safe". Who gets to decide whch sites are OK to cache and whch aren't. Definitions will vary according to the user's location and the regime under which s/he lives (or the location or regime under which the owner/operator of the relay lives. Secondly, by caching (and thus later serving) data the relay ceases to be just a neutral "common carrier" and moves into the realm of hosting provider. I see lots of room for lawyers to get fat(ter) on the back of legal argument about whether a relay providing a cached copy of a document can be sued (for whatever reason). Look at the stupid situation we already have where sites simply pointing to torrent sites are taken down (while of course Google, which has fat lawyers, doesn't get taken down). Thirdly, the simple act of serving a copy from cache, rather than transparently passing the request out to the end server, means that the relay by definition is now intercepting Tor traffic (even if only to "help" the end user). Fourthly, the end user might not /want/ Tor to "help" in this way (I wouldn't). What guarantee do I have that the Tor relay is giving me exactly what I wanted and not some "tampered" copy. How can I really trust a supposedly anonymous network which I now know to be looking into my requests with a view to giving me a "better" or "faster" service. And how would I cope with SSL? Best Mick --------------------------------------------------------------------- Mick Morgan gpg fingerprint: FC23 3338 F664 5E66 876B 72C0 0A1F E60B 5BAD D312 http://baldric.net ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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