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Re: [tor-talk] Bitcoin over Tor isn’t a good idea (Alex Biryukov / Ivan Pustogarov story)



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I didn't realise my nodes didn't allow the bitcoin port. I'll get
right on it.

Also, if anyone in the Tor community has spare capacity, you can also
setup a full bitcoin node on the same server you use as an
exit/relay/bridge and it doesn't take up a great deal of resources
other than disk space (16Gb I think right now and growing slowly). On
my series of exits there is also full bitcoin nodes accessible
exclusively over hidden services and others which are accessible over
regular clearnet.

- -T

On 27/10/2014 19:58, grarpamp wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:35 PM, Erik de Castro Lopo 
> <mle+tools@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> http://arxiv.org/pdf/1410.6079v1.pdf
> 
>> Could this situation be improved if people ran limited exit nodes
>> that only alloed the bitcoin p2p protocol to exit? I for one
>> don't have enough
> 
> There are about ten exit nodes that do only this today. [One of
> which is run by Mike Hearn who has advocated building in censorship
> capabilities to Tor, and blocking (historically) tainted coins 
> (such as you have now or might receive through otherwise
> completely innocent transactions with you, or from your own
> trans/mixing with others).]
> 
> Then there is question if your client will select such 'only *coin'
> nodes versus those with high bandwidth and open exit policies.
> 
> There are also a fair number of hidden services in Tor/I2P/CJDNS 
> that act as bitcoin nodes.
> 
> As related tangent, yes, the bitcoin protocol needs to be
> encrypted on the wire, at least bitcoin node to bitcoin node with
> TLS, obviously and urgently so, particularly if you wish to guard
> your trans from wire listeners.
> 
> You might be best to in fact run bitcoin always and entirely over
> Tor, especially while transacting. But then also routinely compare
> that received blockchain to one you receive via alternate/trusted
> sources, such as clearnet or signed bittorrent checkpoints.
> 

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