[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-talk] if browser remembers URLs visited before shutdown even during Never Remember History
- To: tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: Re: [tor-talk] if browser remembers URLs visited before shutdown even during Never Remember History
- From: Mirimir <mirimir@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 17:29:08 -0700
- Autocrypt: addr=mirimir@xxxxxxxxxx; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= xsBNBFEN49cBCADWl1VZKYO8L+f/65G2nBWzh41VTAZDcJSxMWXrBSvpJzzLt6sJf0L0Rjmy W4VPxJMCm/32auRAp8Xx1iNmBpvYENSM1YJVWfk43tlSOY8CR3TVODMxWPhUu48Pb9OKSntz WHGwdZmOr14zF9vr4PaS9A6+Hyt9FPKuGcQFw7K8jK1Hpp5XgdY/DMHKeaJykJ8JH1HBTFTT OJdxIWu6cZ+spNaNfKdnNjk98hMPw69isVGzcm7b3lJUsjVnMSqnrtZ8CSIv1njyxJH7NB5n LzrE7EiXR37k+4Poc9/DeLSAKrq5N3ZMpX1EDOoXFa8lLVGWHBTwVN/tl7FLM0NmVuL5ABEB AAHNHG1pcmltaXIgPG1pcmltaXJAcmlzZXVwLm5ldD7CwIEEEwECACsCGyMGCwkIBwMCBhUI AgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAhkBBQJafNQ7BQkNMVdkAAoJEGINZVEXwuQ+5LoIAKyZQDkNqj+Y E26o1bdEQlmOLhhXev45euNCnaFrnbOyKLivHdF4vvXyWBTzJmCsoRxTJ0A3Zmwa3ZihbKaU FCAdRgspLfA+TGICVYOztB+faWV18k5OTCk7ZiBQ/mOMQA4p3RPOV+UCgdelvZRHrFdUgHro dho/FqZhRoPdsPPB08QBisDO7SfFMMe9U9EZ03n4f2TvMgaTjK/kZCopwgLj2nB11SnCYfWJ jxUFDs+VFObf/jSK8T0SX9O6p430NWZm30vutUVac9lfodMjBcJqTnFxmZrwQomlCYGvSqNw 4Xy5+/gBzv/flXHngQSU053smHRtrMlGK5OU1RSixDfOwE0EUQ3j1wEIAMDcexhcaIO5jpl+ SHM14zuBvF2QG61IpH4Lag6nQmSMTljizuJg2kLaLbfc69AxmjuL5obqYi5ywXn4kQKqiwfa OHvVlKn662/J5YgXuc8tRLyqvgb+hibtAnlhWAuusP0eoQQP6SAASRjtrb8RVapTzJXy2Snf PtkcdtkTLLLcyeGoDOkpPkspnnp8avvI9ayzhGFLg9qNWaIuBMudxT6oHK4rZH+Sv6km9viI /ziV6E8Z+PpvMsGdebeYBLQA7ueuTbyOGbDyProwvocrKynI/UM40VYS8bS1PjWtljUlj7Vx 8C/746hnfdge0m24jnaWfu5UDjwpsHzs/JXqklsAEQEAAcLAZQQYAQIADwIbDAUCWnzURgUJ DTFXbwAKCRBiDWVRF8LkPsCjCACNvnnmpcDwEbtXUFZD/+ewNlPfM9o0mIXgi7DIVR9MVCw/ u14+mJUlQny4jPRV+hv/erjbiqEcVPZ296J3I4kUvO4slI+ZyODsRQSzwMz6ihwC6nN1xove YSBzVKKQrV+FDHVk6dJVLtgPdewOR9ZAar7mEbCLTJZ/e5aVb+NrlC1jWx3V3mMGCKOsEHhu 97cu3AswlxhzqPjczTo3rjtcfxdjeGU6mIEEAlhUlVDdfbGLODIyCXrP39zYxYXFFpVcbGAu +cndl1AQkIXUiMoJuzTMU8TQ+zz8yLof9fB7Y8O8VbmZBPQqN2IiHPeGbfqZjk/uHjJQUayI +beL0kxL
- Delivered-to: archiver@xxxxxxxx
- Delivery-date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 20:29:25 -0400
- Dkim-signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=riseup.net; s=squak; t=1539390552; bh=kEadi9iwfH/s6gKn9nWA60DOFtIAv4pvJauPZ640hME=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=NKMwblAs0q8t4kPfEzNmEvXNzupH0V3zi8ak79CN5MSB+TCWEY2B7ObT/3eeFc5ro qumk/8H8DNN4GomSxf/cYPtVScWAGKcsraRH7rUNHWd3In2yI9tDP3+BB6Lpw9J9Ll zbTUR8PF+sVMZ7A0aLEM8Xe09ytBCgtIV8VhXkS0=
- In-reply-to: <1504363634.9583208.1539377252340@mail.yahoo.com>
- List-archive: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/>
- List-help: <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=help>
- List-id: "all discussion about theory, design, and development of Onion Routing" <tor-talk.lists.torproject.org>
- List-post: <mailto:tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
- List-subscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk>, <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=subscribe>
- List-unsubscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/tor-talk>, <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=unsubscribe>
- Openpgp: preference=signencrypt
- References: <1504363634.9583208.1539377252340.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1504363634.9583208.1539377252340@mail.yahoo.com>
- Reply-to: tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Sender: "tor-talk" <tor-talk-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
On 10/12/2018 01:47 PM, Nick Levinson wrote:
>> This is the use case for Tails. . . . [T]here are no writes to storage, unless users configure [otherwise] . . . .
>
> One need not use Tails to use Tor (I used to sometimes use Tor and never used Tails), so, while Tails may be a good idea, the question remains for Tor and its security architecture when not using Tails.
Sure, but this isn't a _Tor_ issue. It's just about Tor browser, which
is just (heavily) modified Firefox. And although I'm no software expert,
I'm guessing that it's impossible to guarantee what some code will or
won't leave behind when it crashes. Even if you tweaked the browser to
never write temp files to disk, and keep everything in RAM, you couldn't
guarantee that the OS won't write stuff to disk.
That is, unless there _is_ no disk, as in Tails. Even with Whonix,
traces likely remain in the virtual disk. And sure, you can run Whonix
with virtual disks, which don't persist changes. But even then, who's to
say what might get left on the host. I'm less familiar with other
sandboxing options, but I suspect that there are similar issues.
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk